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Iconic cases illustrate how companies, such as Rolls-Royce, ABB, Caterpillar, and GE (Huikkola, 
Kohtamäki, & Rabetino, 2016) have been increasingly implementing servitization while moving 
from offering stand-alone products to selling solutions.  Selling solutions allows manufacturers to 
supply a combination of products, systems, knowledge, and lifecycle services (Rabetino, 
Kohtamäki, Lehtonen, & Kostama, 2015), but it requires a deep redefinition of manufacturers’ 
business models (Reim, Parida, & Örtqvist, 2014), which involves implementation of different 
repositioning moves within the value system (Wise & Baumgartner, 1999) through different 
mechanisms to redefine the firm boundaries.  
 
Previous studies typically downplay the discussion of strategic repositioning in servitization 
(Bustinza, Bigdeli, Baines, & Elliot, 2015), and mainly recognize repositioning as a way of moving 
closer to customers, increasing the service portfolio and the ‘serviceable’ installed-based, and 
obtaining new skills and competencies. However, the role of industry power and the study of 
particular strategic moves aimed at increasing companies’ sphere of influence during strategic 
positioning within the value system are essential, but then again often neglected concepts. Vertical 
repositioning in not straightforward and typically involves challenging the position of other players 
in the value systems when strategically moving not only to where the money is (Wise & 
Baumgartner, 1999) but also to where the money will be in the future (Christensen, Raynor, & 
Verlinden, 2001:74). Consequently, distribution of power is central when explaining the dynamics 
of repositioning moves (Sturgeon, 2008). Throughout these moves, companies must “explore 
penetration points in multiple tiers that are not immediately adjacent” and look for “opportunities 
to influence customer demand” (Pil & Holweg, 2006:73). Drawing on an in-depth single case study 
of one global company in the ship power sector that has been implementing servitization for more 
than fifteen years, this chapter illustrates the implications of industry power and its consequences 
on firm vertical positioning within the value system.  
 
2. THEORY  
 
Vertical positioning is built on boundary-related decisions that include considerations regarding 
the product range and decisions of investing/divesting in infrastructural activities but also 
decisions regarding moving downstream into servicing and upstream into component 
manufacturing (Chandraprakaikul, Baines, Lim, & Sakburanapech, 2010). Thus, positioning 
involves a firm’s decision about which value-adding activities should be performed internally and 
which should be outsourced to suppliers, partners, distributors, and/or customers (Baines, Kay, 
Adesola, & Higson, 2005). Companies may either integrate or change their position in the value 
system to not only leverage the use of existing resources and core capabilities by following a 
diversification strategy but also acquire those needed capabilities that firms do not currently 
possess. However, repositioning not only becomes a central notion for a focal firm but also 
involves moves that challenge other industry players’ positions. Thus, distribution of power is 
central when explaining the dynamics of repositioning moves (Sturgeon, 2008). Companies must 
recognize who are the key actors in the industry, how the value system is governed, how the inter-
firm division of labor is organized (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005), and how the value is 
created and distributed within the value stream (Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2010). Several concepts 
address these power-related issues. For instance, “platform leaders” (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002) 
and “keystones” (Iansiti & Levien, 2004) are used to describe situations where firms have the 
power of setting standards and rules in an industry. Governing “bottlenecks” within industries is a 
necessary condition to reach “architectural advantage” (Grant, 2010:82), which can be achieve by 
enhancing mobility across the value chain, redefining roles and responsibilities by looking at what 
other player’s needs, and becoming a less replaceable bottleneck within the industry architecture 
(Jacobides, 2011). 
 
Following the resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and industrial organization (Porter, 
1980) traditions, firms may change their positioning within the industry value system to obtain 
capabilities, to reduce the causes of external uncertainty, and to control strategic relationships, 
knowledge and resources. Repositioning becomes a tool to “determine the sphere of organizational 
influence, including its degree of industry control and its power over the external forces” (Santos 
& Eisenhardt, 2005:491). Accordingly, firms may go downstream to offset (intermediate and end) 
customers’ bargaining power or to improve product differentiation by providing a better service 
for customers and strengthening the firm’s brand (Porter, 1980). Appropriating successive 
markups, dominating the linkages where purchasing decisions are made (Pil & Holweg, 2006), 
and establishing industry standards downstream while ensuring the consolidation of the main 
products on the original upstream market are also relevant reasons. Conversely, firms can move 
upstream to raise rivals’ costs and establish entry and/or mobility barriers to gain power and reduce 
the dependence on a single supplier while guaranteeing a strategic supply under favorable 
conditions (Porter, 1980). 
 
3. A PORTERIAN TOOLKIT FOR UNDERSTANDING REPOSITIONING IN 
SERVITIZATION 
 
Many iconic manufactures have been establishing competitive advantages from servitization based 
on different steps of vertical repositioning (Davies, 2004; Wise & Baumgartner, 1999). 
Repositioning has typically been study as a way of reconfiguring the required resources and 
capabilities (Huikkola et al., 2016), which include system integration and project management, IT 
capabilities, consulting, financial competences, delivery, and post-sales service capabilities 
(Brady, Davies, & Gann, 2005). However, the successful development and deployment of new 
services is also related to the degree of control a firm exercises over a service value chain (Raynor 
& Christensen 2002). Thus, the need for increasing industry power may also explain why 
servitizing firms move vertically to safeguard their domain (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2004). 
Vertical control should guarantee access to end customers to enter into a higher-return business. 
Furthermore, a vertically integrated structure can provide means to guarantee that product 
specifications and services can be adjusted to diverse customer needs (Davies, 2004).  
 
Baines, Lightfoot, and Smart (2011:950) present two positioning practices between conventional 
manufacturers and conventional service providers: 1) focusing on product-centric services while 
keeping a tail in production operations, or 2) combining original equipment manufacturer and 
product-centric services. Davies et al. (2007) propose two ideal types of organizing the integrated 
selling and delivering of solutions: 1) the system integrator that coordinates the integration of 
components supplied by other firms and 2) the vertically integrated system seller that produces all 
product and service components in a system. For instance, system integration is a deliberate 
“strategic business activity” that facilitates firms to shape “their position in an industry value 
stream” over time while “enabling them to decide who to compete with, who to collaborate with, 
what to make in-house, and what to outsource” (Hobday et al., 2005:1136). Whereas vertical 
integration through mergers and acquisitions appears to be a common pattern of internalizing 
environmental sources of uncertainty for firms when moving downstream, the control of the value 
system can also be achieved successfully without full ownership by using quasi-integration, 
alliances, franchises, and joint ventures (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). 
 
3.1. Industry structure and the transition from systems to solutions 
 
Let us consider a system supplier in the shipbuilding industry as an example. Shipping and 
shipbuilding industries started feeling the effects of deep globalization during the early 1980s. One 
of the most significant consequences was a deep change in the way the whole shipbuilding industry 
worked. By the late 1990s, looking for operational flexibility and technical integration efficiency, 
and affected by their exposure to demand volatility, shipyards began to demand turnkey systems 
from their suppliers while becoming ‘system integrators’. For example, shipyards demanded 
propulsion systems rather than their components in an individual way because the system 
procurement strategy enables the use less providers. Today, many yards focus more focused on 
project management and cost efficiency and, in some segments, the value added in a new ship is 
increasingly coming from system suppliers. The installation of turnkey systems also simplified 
ship operators/owners’ daily processes while increasing operational reliability and cost efficiency. 
This strategy also enables the use of only a single lifecycle service provider (after the warranty 
period is over). Becoming a subsystem integrator also was convenient for component suppliers. 
They not only have the best knowledge of their components, but also by fulfilling such a role was 
an opportunity to add aftermarket services as part of the total offering.  
 
Our illustrative case example seized the new opportunities by shifting the emphasis in its business 
from engine delivery to the integration of systems. Based on the combination of lowered total cost 
and enhanced performance for the customer, system integration was thought of as a differentiation 
strategy because of the competitive pressures from low-cost countries. However, the system 
integration strategy has turned into a highly spread industry recipe during the following years. In 
a highly globalized, volatile, and cyclical shipbuilding industry (Cho & Porter, 1986; Stopford, 
2009), the structural forces (Porter, 1980) of the marine propulsion industry pushed the hitherto 







Figure 1. Five forces in the propulsion industry. 
 
 Source: own elaboration based on Porter (1980) and industry reports from 2000 to 2015.  
Regarding the rivalry, the market for propulsion systems is controlled by few European and Asian 
manufacturers (and licensees), where the share of the latter group has been continuously increasing 
during the last years. The business is a mature and capital-intensive industry lead by several global 
dominant players constantly struggling to improve their volumes and market share. Still, there is 
a need for constant investment in technology and R&D, and the market leadership undoubtedly 
depends on the engine type and market segment. The major suppliers must invest in networking 
efforts to ensure a global presence (often through licensing) while combining the localization of 
production facilities in low-cost countries with constant innovation to maintain competitiveness. 
While some competitors have more comprehensive portfolios and integrated offerings, other 
companies are only active in certain market segments.  
 
Regarding the customers, the ‘propulsion business’ consists of two connected markets: propulsion 
systems for the shipyards (primary market), and aftersales services for ship operators (secondary 
market). Shipbuilding includes the assembly of new ships and its associated activities (repairing, 
maintenance and conversion). Whereas backward integration from yards is a real threat (offering 
own engines), few large conglomerates dominate the industry today (mainly from South Korea; 
China; Japan and Western European countries). The aim of shipyards is to meet the standard 
reliability and legal requirements at the lowest possible cost. Despite the high barriers to entry (e.g. 
regulations, scale economies, capital and expertise), new entrants have cyclically entered the 
shipbuilding industry driven not only by demand peaks, but also promoted by local governments. 
Increasing arrivals lead to overcapacity once the demand peak is over, creating oversupply. 
Overcapacity has been promoting mergers and acquisitions waves for years. Due to the 
combination of high fixed costs, overcapacity and high exit barriers price is a key competitive 
factor. Thus, price cutting practices and the search for cost efficiency based on economies of scale 
and low-cost locations for operations are common strategies.  
 
In addition, the number of operators is relative low compared with the number of shipyards once 
the marked is properly segmented. Whereas many operators have become global carriers and have 
increased their bargaining power during the last years, the decision power regarding the ship design 
has been partially moved from shipyards to ship owners. Typically, ship operators demand 
uninterrupted operations at the lowest possible guaranteed lifetime costs (total cost of ownership). 
The relatively low switching cost and long-term one purchasing decisions increase operators’ 
bargaining power because a failure to secure an order may prevent a yard or a propulsion system 
provider trading with an operator for a long time. Moreover, the selection of one engine type can 
lead to a domino effect within the industry, with other competing buyers following the same 
decision. 
 
The provision of after-sales support to a large installed base during the system lifecycle (30 years) 
is an important source of sales and profits. Access to this secondary market depends largely on 
completing the original sale of new propulsion systems, which provides the opportunity for the 
provider to offer after-sales services. Ship-owners in different market segments have dissimilar 
needs in terms of professional support and operational guarantees, ranging from those who want a 
low-cost service to those who need full service contracts. In any case, neither the shipyards nor the 
engine manufacturers are able to control this secondary market entirely because of the existence 
of relatively low entry barriers. Attracted by the prospect of achieving significant benefits, a large 
but heterogeneous group of companies selling components and providing basic services (e.g. 
repair, maintenance, and overhaul) and spare parts, has emerged nearby the most relevant system 
manufacturers over the past 20 years. Once again, system suppliers may increase the control of the 
secondary market by providing solutions provider and service agreements that include advance 
services (e.g., remote diagnostics, and operational services).  
 
Finally, whereas the threats of substitute products and potential new entrants are weak (high entry 
barriers such as R&D investments, reputation and customer loyalty, system integration and project 
management capabilities), only a few suppliers of engines components have some relative but still 
limited bargaining power (e.g., injection systems, cylinders liners, pistons sets, crankshafts, 
dampers, turbochargers and coupling systems). Markets for other relevant components of the 
propulsion system are fragmented and highly competitive (e.g., propellers, thrusters, gears, seals, 
and bearings). 
 
Facing such an industry structure, moving from a transaction-based to a relational-based model 
that is customer centered and based on solutions and advanced services while locking-in customers 
though service agreements and increasing the switching cost is a way to not only increase 
differentiation (reduce rivalry) and reduce the bargaining power of customers but also build 
stronger entry barriers. Finally, the bargaining power of suppliers may be reduced (even more) 
through dual sourcing strategies, intellectual property of components in new portfolios, signing 
exclusivity agreements, and buying the key suppliers or developing new ones though cooperation. 
 
3.2. (Re) positioning for solution provision: A value system approach 
 
Moving towards solutions involved for the case company a change in the organizational structure 
while reconsidering the scope of vertical positioning. For instance, the acquisition of a company 
specialized in propulsion systems (2002) and an agreement for manufacturing propellers (2004) 
were the initial steps when becoming a system supplier. Then, our case company initiated a 
strategic step that has been broader than the change from an engine maker to a system integrator. 
The company acquired several service providers to develop new service products and speed up 
deliveries. Maintenance and operational services provision for the systems sold became a 
necessary constitutive component of the new value proposition, providing means to maximize the 
customer value and create competitive advantages, revenues, and profits. Although the company 
already had services (field services, spare parts, and projects), they were still sold rather unbundled. 
Over subsequent years (2004-2011), the development and/or acquisition of new capabilities to 
offer solutions and service agreements composed of systems and services to support customer 
processes (Mathieu, 2001) became the company’s strategic target. A detailed analysis of the last 
16 annual reports of the case company allows us to translate this transformation into systematic 
and quantifiable strategic moves from 2000 to 2016. Pictorially, our service transition map 
illustrates that whereas upstream strategy was based mostly on joint ventures, alliances, and license 
agreements, investments and acquisitions were the chosen mechanisms for the downstream value 
migration from 2000 to 2015 (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Service transition map: repositioning within the value system. 
 
 Source: own elaboration based on Davies (2004) and our case company’s annual reports from 2000 to 2015. * Each sphere represents one strategic boundary-related move, including new companies, workshops, offices, service facilities, and training / education centers. ** The case company has around 20 license agreements worldwide. Only the new license agreements during the period are included in the table, but not the extensions.  
In project-based businesses with tailored outcomes, the need for cross-system coordination and 
knowledge sharing across complementary components and systems also reveals that 
modularization has limits. Movement system supplier towards system integration means that the 
firm becomes a knowledge integrator with a strategic role in designing and developing the system. 
Controlling key physical systems and the acquisition of service capabilities to guarantee the 
lifecycle performance of the system becomes critical factor to assure system reliability and the 
profitability of the new business strategy. Controlling the interdependent links in a value system 
allows companies to capture the most profit, and thus, these component interdependencies will 
shape firm boundary decisions. Therefore, the case company needed a higher degree of vertical 
control to coordinate and guarantee system compatibility and a threshold level of performance 
(Osegowitsch & Madhok, 2003) while ensuring that product specifications and services can be 
tailored and adjusted to the needs of different customers when supplying systems (Davies, 2004).  
 
Technical aspects, such as lower engineering costs and faster construction time, as well as the dual 
need to minimize the “cost of response” and maximize the “speed and effectiveness of respond” 
to particular customer needs (Baines et al., 2011: 952) became relevant drivers for the case 
company when deciding how to provide solutions for the marine industry. In particular, customer 
preferences regarding performance features, such as fuel consumption, emissions, and noise, 
became a key to understanding the need to control how subsystems must be coupled and how the 
value system processes are organized (Baines et al., 2011; Fine, Vardan, Pethick, & El-Hout, 
2002). In the presence of integral systems (Ulrich, 1995), these solutions can only be provided by 
controlling “knowledge in engineering and manufacturing domains” while allowing “significant 
dependence for supply in manufacturing capacity” (Fine et al., 2002:73). 
 
In addition, being close to the customer was an opportunity for the case company to not only access 
market information and a more profitable business, but also to acquire influence and new 
competences upon which the company can build a non-contestable position in the propulsion 
industry (Porter, 1980). As suggested by Kaplinsky (2000), the ability to govern the value system 
often arises from intangible competences, such as marketing, R&D, design, and branding. Also, 
by “understanding the anatomy of purchasing decisions”, firms are able to make better choices 
“about ways to shift control over the demand and manage risk” (Pil & Holweg, 2006:80). 
 
The case company identified ship design as a permeable break/penetration point and thus bought 
design companies as a way of doing business and of positioning itself in between yards and 
operators and controlling ship design. This strategic move would favor the company’s propulsion 
systems because the company could design the ship such that customers can derive the highest 
possible value from its systems. Furthermore, this move would enable the company to offer 
solutions and lifecycle service agreements to ship operators (including preventive maintenance). 
Therefore, entering the ship design market for the company became a strategy to achieve upstream 
market lock-in (Porter, 1980) and downstream knowledge by increasing the cost of switching the 
supplier of propulsion systems and also the company’s lifecycle bargaining power over both yards 
and ship operators. Other example is the acquisition of a UK-based producer of scrubbers in 2012. 
This acquisition was an important part of the case company’s growth strategy in the marine gas, 
offshore, and environmental solutions markets. The acquisition was implemented for developing 
a first-mover advantage in a profitable business segment, but also to control the competing 
environmental technology (different from the option developed in house) before knowing which 
will become the industry standard. Since companies can make above-average profits when their 
technology turns out to be the industry standard (Funk, 2003), securing the adoption of the focal 
organization’s industry standard is a way to increase industry power  (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). 
 
Finally, investing in the development of a global company-owned service network to acquire 
operational and maintenance capacity also was a major target. This move opens a direct channel 
to end customers (ship operators), which provides a source of information and knowledge that 
allows companies to offer improved services for the current systems while gaining knowledge 
from customers to improve future systems (Baines et al., 2011; Davies, 2004; Osegowitsch & 
Madhok, 2003). 
 
4. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
This chapter was set out to contribute to the literature on value system (re)positioning in the context 
of the servitization process of a manufacturer when migrating from a system integrator to a solution 
provider. To this end, we analyzed the patterns of repositioning moves made by the case company 
over the last 15 years. We discuss how structural conditions drive manufactures’ servitization 
through different vertical moves to repositioning within the industry value system and shed light 
on both the role of market power during the implementation of servitization strategies and the use 
of different vertical practices as repositioning mechanisms. Moreover, this chapter illustrates how 
the power approach to firm boundaries complements the widespread capability view and 
contributes to value system analysis in servitization. Accordingly, re-positioning within the value 
system was a double opportunity for acquiring new competences and influence upon which the 
company can build a non-contestable position in the industry and lock-in customers. In this 
situation, the power and competence notions are symbiotic.  
 
Whereas the chosen repositioning mechanisms for downstream moves were investments and 
acquisitions, which allowed for the control of core resources and key linkages in the value system, 
the upstream moves, at the core of the company’s traditional business, were mostly based on 
collaborative practices, such as licensing, long-term contracts, strategic alliances, and joint 
ventures. The combination of the above mechanisms allowed the case company to access critical 
capabilities, decrease external dependencies, and increase its sphere of influence. Aligned with the 
findings of Pil and Holweg (2006), our case also demonstrated that re-positioning goes beyond 
adjacent activities and involves detecting profitable points within the value system. The case 
company was able to recognize where money can be made (Wise & Baumgartner, 1999) as well 
as “…where, in an industry’s shifting value chain, the money will be made in the future” and 
strategically move to where the money will be (Christensen et al. 2001:74).  
 
Using a forward-looking interpretation, our case seems to support existing evidence that shows 
how some industries may reintegrate when participant firms change strategies to cope with 
commoditization and changes in customer demands (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005). Once the 
firms within the value system and industry understood the new rules and opportunities, many of 
them intended to shift their position along the value system to find rents. Even component suppliers 
attempted to benefit from the new situation by offering spare parts directly to ship 
operators/owners or joining networks with other providers to offer a portfolio of after-sales 
services. Therefore, once the existing division of labor became inadequate to meet the changing 
needs of the customers, the new situation encouraged industry participants to reshape the value 
chain while searching for new forms of vertical structures with a new division of labor (Cacciatori 
& Jacobides, 2005). This discussion could be extended by adding further evidence on the nature 
of value creation and appropriation logics in different positions within the value system and on 
why value migrates from one value system point to another (Dietl, Royer, & Stratmann, 2009). 
 
There are several strategic barriers associated with repositioning. Building strong joint ventures 
and alliances and learning how to integrate knowledge and retain people from acquired companies 
are both critical and challenging. Furthermore, creating an extensive service network and finding 
competent people to offer field services are neither straightforward nor easy processes. In addition, 
industry conditions are key determinants of the smoothness of this value migration. While it can 
take some time to become familiar with the new practices, roles, and rules in the industry, rivalry 
in service markets will eventually intensify and all services will turn into a commodity 
(Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008), which can alter the differentiating power of an advanced 
service strategy over time. Consequently, the real sources of differentiation and competitive 
advantage will be the implementation rather than the strategy itself (Rabetino, Kohtamäki, & 
Gebauer, 2017). An early understanding of the importance of key novel industry trends has given 
the case company the possibility to dominate, at least temporarily, key sources of competitive 
advantages. Being the first mover allowed our case company to re-organize its value system 
functionally for the new customer-centric strategy and develop efficient and reliable systems and 
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